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This paper discusses the successes and failures of Japanese mone-
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the light of optimal policy rules. First, we quantitatively conceptual-
ize the Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s policy decisions by employing Bernanke
and Mihov’s (1998) econometric methodology for developing monetary-
policy measures, and term the resulting policy measure the ‘actual pol-
icy measure’. Next, assuming that the BOJ is committed to optimal
policy rules, we simulate optimal policy paths, which we term ‘optimal
policy measures’. We evaluate Japanese monetary policy historically
by comparing actual and optimal policy measures.
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1 Introduction
Historical analyses of monetary policy generally require the use of particular
policy rules as yardsticks. The comparison of an ideal policy path implied
by a policy rule and an actual policy enables historical assessment of pol-
icy decisions and an exploration of the timing of policy mistakes. Taylor’s
(1993, 1999) study of U.S. monetary history is an important and well-known
example of comparative analysis. He introduced an interest-rate rule, known
as the Taylor rule, which represents the response of a policy interest rate
to a deviation of the inﬂation rate from its target value and to the output
gap. Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) proposed a forward-looking Taylor rule to
evaluate monetary policy quantitatively in industrialized countries. What
the interest-rate rules have in common is that their adoption requires the
presumption that policy rates, such as the federal funds rate and the call
rate, represent central banks’ past policy decisions as prospective policy in-
dicators. By considering the historically set values of the policy interest rate
as actual policy decisions, while considering simulated values of the inter-
est rate based on an interest-rate rule as optimal policy decisions, we can
explore success and failure in the previous conduct of monetary policy. 1
Recent studies of Japanese monetary policy have examined monetary his-
tory from the viewpoint of interest-rate rules. Bernanke and Gertler (1999)
and Jinushi et al. (2000) used interest-rate rules based on the forward-
looking Taylor rule. McCallum (2000, 2003) evaluated monetary history
quantitatively from the viewpoint of the simple Taylor rule. 2 These applica-
1In general, monetary policy rules, such as the Taylor rule and the forward-looking
Taylor rule, which directly express how policy rates as monetary-policy instruments change
in response to target variables, have been referred to as instrument rules. Instrument
rules do not necessary require the use of policy rates as policy instruments. For example,
McCallum (1988) proposed a monetary policy rule that requires the management of high-
powered money rather than a policy rate.
2McCallum’s studies of Japanese monetary history adopted his own high-powered
money rule as well as the Taylor rule. The high-powered money rule is referred to as
2
tions of interest-rate rules to Japanese monetary policy adopt the overnight
call rate as the policy indicator of the Bank of Japan (BOJ). Furthermore,
they assess Japanese monetary history by comparing the historically set val-
ues of the call rate with simulated values for the call rate based on interest-
rate rules.
The use of inadequate policy indicators, which do not precisely reﬂect
central banks’ past decisions, not only prevents a quantitative conceptual-
ization of actual policy decisions, but also leads to erroneous assessments
of past policy conduct. This means that accurate evaluation of monetary
history requires an adequate policy indicator and the corresponding policy
rule. The above studies of Japanese monetary history, which used interest-
rate rules as yardsticks, depend on the assumption that the BOJ has always
implemented policy changes by changing the call rate. That is, the behavior
of the call rate reﬂects the BOJ’s policy decisions over time. However, in
historical analyses of Japanese monetary policy, this assumption may not
apply for three reasons. First, since July 1995, the call rate has hardly
changed from around zero (see Figure 1). Second, since March 2001, the
BOJ has adopted a new policy framework, which involves expanding the
reserves as much as lowering the call rate. Third, previous studies of the
BOJ’s policy indicators for the period up to June 1995, when the call rate
remained positive and subject to change, do not necessarily support the view
that only the call rate reﬂects the BOJ’s policy decisions. 3
These discussions suggest that the call rate alone may not be suﬃ-
cient to explain the BOJ’s decisions over time. Therefore, the adoption
of interest-rate rules involving the call rate would lead to incorrect assess-
the McCallum rule.
3Shioji (2000) and Nakashima (2005) explored policy indicators of the BOJ to June
1995 by using vector autoregression (VAR) methodology. Shioji concluded that the call
rate and quantity indicators such as M2+CDs or high-powered money, may be useful as
policy indicators of the BOJ. On the other hand, Nakashima concluded that the call rate
is the best policy indicator of the BOJ.
3
ments of Japanese monetary policy. In this paper, we use the structural
VAR methodology of Bernanke and Mihov (1998) to quantitatively con-
ceptualize the BOJ’s policy decisions. Their methodology enables us to
develop monetary policy measures of central banks by formulating equilib-
rium econometric models of the reserve market. In general, central banks
aim to stabilize the macroeconomy by intervening in the reserve market
and by setting reserves or short-term interest rates within a target range.
Their methodology is convincing in that it assumes that monetary variables
that are aﬀected by the operating procedures of central banks in the reserve
market embody the decisions of central banks. 4
Bernanke and Mihov developed an equilibrium model of the U.S. reserve
market to construct a quantitative policy measure of the Fed. In this paper,
by thoroughly applying Bernanke and Mihov’s econometric methodology to
Japanese monetary policy, we consider the following: (1) the institutional
diﬀerences between the U.S. and Japanese reserve markets; and (2) the shift
in the BOJ’s discount-window policy in July 1995. The former involves
formulating a model of the Japanese reserve market that diﬀers from that
developed by Bernanke and Mihov for the U.S. reserve market. The latter
involves modeling two equilibrium models of the Japanese reserve market:
one each for before and after July 1995. In this paper, to identify the BOJ’s
policy indicator, we present two original models of the Japanese reserve mar-
ket. Each model captures the institutional features of the Japanese reserve
market and reﬂects the diﬀerence in the BOJ’s operating procedures before
and after the BOJ changed its discount-window policy. 5 By using the two
4Bernanke and Mihov’s econometric methodology therefore does not assume the broad
money supply such as M1 or M2 as policy indicators. Miyao (2005) claimed that Japan’s
money supply has not worked not only as an intermediate target since the late 1970s (see
Okina, 1993), but also as an information variable to predict future economic activity since
the late 1990s.
5Nakashima (2005) analyzed the operating procedures of the BOJ up to June 1995 by
employing Bernanke and Mihov’s econometric methodology. He excluded the period from
4
equilibrium models, we empirically demonstrate that individual monetary
variables alone cannot explain the BOJ’s past policy decisions. Speciﬁcally,
in the paper, we show that, in the subperiod to February 2001, the call rate
alone could be used as the policy indicator of the BOJ. However, in the sub-
period from March 2001, an equally weighted average of the call rate and
reserves should be used. Furthermore, by applying the Bernanke–Mihov
methodology, we identify the BOJ’s policy indicator for the entire period
from January 1980 to May 2003. This indicator, termed the ‘actual pol-
icy measure’, is assumed to explain the BOJ’s historical decisions, or ‘real’
Japanese monetary policy.
In the context of a historical evaluation of Japanese monetary policy,
how should we deﬁne optimal policy paths, or ‘ideal’ Japanese monetary
policy, using the obtained actual policy measure? One possibility is to apply
interest-rate rules. However, the application of an interest-rate rule is prob-
lematic. Since the components of the actual policy measure vary between
periods, it is diﬃcult to apply this rule. Furthermore, as Svensson (1997)
has pointed out, coeﬃcients of target variables in a policy response function
characterized as an interest-rate rule are combinations of deep parameters,
which deﬁne central banks’ weight preferences on the target variables or
macroeconomic structures. This implies that we cannot use a central bank’s
weight preference to simulate an optimal policy path.
In this paper, we adopt the so-called targeting rule, which requires the
establishment of a central bank’s objective function with weight preferences
on target variables. Speciﬁcally, we set up the BOJ’s objective function
in the form of a quadratic loss function, which comprises deviations of the
output gap and the rate of inﬂation from their target values. Moreover,
July 1995, and thus did not consider the shift in the BOJ’s discount-window policy in
July 1995. In this paper, by including the period from July 1995, we consider the policy
shift to develop a quantitative policy measure over time.
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under the assumption that the BOJ commits itself to particular targeting
rules, we simulate optimal policy paths, termed ‘optimal policy measures’,
which represent past optimal policy decisions of the BOJ. Of course, de-
cisions that are optimal at the time probably depend on the type of tar-
geting rule to which the BOJ commits itself. Hence, we focus on three
targeting rules: the ‘ﬂexible targeting rule’, the ‘strict inﬂation-targeting
rule’ and the ‘strict output-targeting rule’, each of which is characterized
by the BOJ’s weight preferences on output and inﬂation stabilization. To
evaluate Japanese monetary history, we compare actual and optimal policy
measures, each obtained by adopting the three targeting rules as yardsticks.
Speciﬁcally, this comparison shows that the historical evaluation of Japanese
monetary policy, particularly from the early 1990s, depends on the targeting
rules used as yardsticks. However, whatever targeting rules are adopted, we
conclude that a tightening of monetary policy by the BOJ was delayed in
the late 1980s, and that the BOJ’s policy stance in the early 1990s was too
contractionary.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we determine the ac-
tual policy measure by applying the econometric methodology of Bernanke
and Mihov. In Section 3, we determine optimal policy measures. In this
section, we also examine success and failure in the past conduct of Japanese
monetary policy by comparing actual and optimal policy measures. Section
4 concludes the paper.
2 Determining an Actual Policy Measure
Applying Bernanke and Mihov’s structural VAR methodology involves de-
veloping equilibrium econometric models of the reserve market. In partic-
ular, when modeling the Japanese reserve market, it should be noted that
the introduction of a low interest-rate policy in July 1995 shifted the BOJ’s
6
discount-window policy. In this section, we determine the actual policy mea-
sure of the BOJ by considering the shift in the discount-window policy and
the institutional diﬀerences between operating procedures in Japan and the
U.S.
2.1 Bernanke and Mihov’s Methodology
To determine the actual policy measure of the BOJ, we follow Bernanke and
Mihov in supposing that the economy is described by the linear structural
model given by equations (1) and (2):
Y t =
k∑
i=0
BiY t−i +
k∑
i=1
CiP t−i + Ayv
y
t (1)
P t =
k∑
i=0
DiY t−i +
k∑
i=0
GiP t−i + Apv
p
t (2)
where variables in bold type denote vectors or matrices.
Following Bernanke and Mihov, we refer to Y and P as ‘nonpolicy’ and
‘policy’ variables, respectively. The set of policy variables includes variables
that are potentially useful as direct indicators of the stance of monetary
policy, such as short-term interest rates and reserve measures. Nonpolicy
variables include other economic variables, such as output and inﬂation.
In equations (1) and (2), the vs are mutually uncorrelated ‘structural’ or
‘primitive’ disturbances. In particular, one element of vpt is a money-supply
shock or monetary-policy shock. The other elements of vpt may include
shocks to money demand or any disturbance that aﬀects the policy variables.
Bernanke and Mihov assumed that the nonpolicy variables, Y , depend
only on lagged values of the policy variables (C0 = 0). Given the timing
assumption, the system given by (1) and (2) can be rewritten in VAR form
(with only lagged variables on the right-hand side) and estimated by stan-
dard methods. As in Bernanke and Mihov, let upt be the parts of the VAR
7
residuals in the policy block that are orthogonal to the VAR residuals in the
nonpolicy block. Then Bernanke and Mihov showed that upt satisﬁes:
(I −G0)upt = Apvpt . (3)
Equation (3) is a standard structural VAR system, which relates observ-
able VAR-based innovations, u, to unobservable structural shocks, v. The
Bernanke–Mihov methodology involves identifying exogenous components of
monetary policy and examining policy indicators by developing equilibrium
models of the reserve market in the form of (3). To model the Japanese
reserve market, we discuss the BOJ’s operating procedures in the light of
its discount-window policy.
2.2 The BOJ’s Discount-Window Policy
To develop an equilibrium model of the reserve market, we must understand
the central bank’s policy behavior in the reserve market; i.e., how it supplies
high-powered money (reserves plus currency).
In general, central banks have two ways of controlling the supply of high-
powered money. One is to engage in open-market operations and the other
is to engage in discount-window lending. In particular, management of the
discount window takes two forms depending on the relationship between
the discount rate and short-term policy rates such as the call rate and the
federal funds rate. One form relates to the way in which a central bank sets
the discount rate below the short-term policy rate. The other relates to the
way in which it sets the short-term rate below the discount rate.
Historically, the BOJ has adopted both forms of discount-window policy.
Figure 1 shows paths of the call rate and the discount rate, which indicate
that the discount rate remained below the call rate until June 1995 and
has remained above it since July 1995, when the BOJ implemented a low
interest-rate policy. This suggests that management of the BOJ’s discount-
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window policy before June 1995 was similar to that of the Federal Reserve
(Fed), because the U.S. discount rate is persistently below the federal funds
rate. However, there is an important diﬀerence. The BOJ eased (tightened)
policy by increasing (reducing) discount-window borrowing quotas for pri-
vate banks. Therefore, the BOJ took the initiative to control the level of
discount-window lending and regulated the quantity of borrowing. Since,
in Japan, moral suasion is not used in the manner used by the Fed to re-
duce discount-window borrowing, private banks usually borrow their quota
amounts. In the literature on Japan’s monetary policy, this type of manage-
ment of the BOJ’s discount window is generally termed ‘credit rationing’. 6
On the other hand, in the literature on U.S. monetary policy, it is supposed
that borrowing from the Fed depends on private banks’ decisions, and that
the Fed endogenously accommodates the demand for discount-window bor-
rowing by private banks. To model the Japanese reserve market, we must
consider diﬀerences between discount-window management in Japan and the
U.S. 7
In July 1995, the BOJ, by setting the discount rate above the call rate,
converted the discount rate into a penalty rate. The penalty rate eliminates
the need for rationing at the discount window, and private banks usually
have no incentive to borrow from the BOJ. Therefore, the BOJ’s discount
window accommodates demand shocks for discount-window borrowing pro-
vided systemic risk in the short-term money market makes it diﬃcult for
private banks to obtain ﬁnance in this market.
Given the history of the BOJ’s discount-window policy, we must develop
6Hamada and Iwata (1980) and Honda (1984) each developed theoretical models of
the credit-rationing view, and the former used empirical analysis to support their view.
Furthermore, Ueda (1993) stated “The discount rate has always been lower than the call
rate. Therefore, discount-window lending has been rationed in Japan. And the level of
lending has been changed by the BOJ, not by private banks” (p.12, lines 17–19).
7The type of discount-window policy pursued by the U.S. is generally referred to as
the ‘implicit cost regime’ in the literature on Japan’s monetary policy.
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two equilibrium models of the Japanese reserve market: for before and after
June 1995. In the following subsections, we present two equilibrium models
of the Japanese reserve market. One is the Credit Rationing (CR) model,
applicable up to June 1995, and the other is the Low Interest-Rate (LIP)
model, applicable from July 1995.
2.3 Before June 1995 – CR (Credit Rationing) Model
The following system, (4)–(9), describes the CR model:
ure = ubr + umo − ugd − ucu (4)
ugd = vgd (5)
ucu = −αur + vcu (6)
ure = −βur + vre (7)
ubr = φgdvgd + φcuvcu + φrevre + φmovmo + vbr (8)
umo = θgdvgd + θcuvcu + θrevre + θbrvbr + vmo (9)
where gd, cu, re, br and mo denote government deposits, currency, reserves,
borrowed reserves and assets held through open-market operations by the
BOJ, respectively, and r denotes the call rate.
Equation (4) is the market-equilibrium condition for bank reserves, which
is based on an identity between assets and liabilities on the BOJ’s balance
sheet (see Table 1). 8 Equation (5) implies that the BOJ accommodates
ﬂuctuations in the demand for government funds, vgd. Equation (6) relates
innovations in the demand for currency, ucu, to innovations in the call rate,
8It is important to note that, unlike the Fed, the BOJ has not used the concept of
nonborrowed reserves. This is a major diﬀerence between the operating procedures of the
BOJ and those of the Fed. Bernanke and Mihov’s econometric model of the U.S. reserve
market incorporates an equilibrium condition for total reserves, (member-bank deposits
plus vault cash) = borrowed reserves + nonborrowed reserves. Kasa and Popper (1997)
have already applied the Bernanke–Mihov methodology to Japanese monetary policy.
However, their analysis is deﬁcient because it uses the concept of nonborrowed reserves:
it does not take account of the institutional diﬀerences between Japan and the U.S.
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ur, and an autonomous shock to currency demand, vcu. Similarly, equa-
tion (7) represents the bank’s demand for reserves, expressed in the form of
innovations: it states that innovations in the demand for reserves, ure, de-
pend negatively on innovations in the call rate, ur, and on a reserve demand
shock, vre.
Equation (8) represents the distinguishing feature of the CR model. It
shows that the BOJ controls the level of discount-window lending and ra-
tions lending to private banks. Hence, we interpret this equation as a behav-
ior function for the BOJ. In particular, vbr represents the supply shock for
discount-window lending and is deﬁned as a policy shock. 9 Equation (9)
is the second behavior function in the CR model, and shows how the BOJ
supplies high-powered money by using open-market operations. In particu-
lar, vmo represents the high-powered money supply shock from using open-
market operations and can be considered as the second monetary-policy
shock, with vbr in equation (8) being the ﬁrst.
The CRmodel implies that the BOJ aﬀects the short-term money market
and the macroeconomy through both open-market operations and discount-
window lending, because the model has two BOJ behavior functions. Fur-
thermore, the two BOJ behavior functions are essentially equivalent in that
they are high-powered money supply functions of the BOJ. Therefore, in the
CR model, it is the quantity, rather than the composition, of high-powered
money that matters. Hence, adding equations (8) and (9) yields the follow-
9Equation (8) indicates another major diﬀerence between the operating procedures of
the BOJ and those of the Fed. In the literature on U.S. monetary policy, it is supposed
that private banks are reluctant to borrow from the discount window because of various
sanctions and restrictions imposed by the Fed on banks’ use of the window. Hence, the Fed
only accommodates demand for discount-window borrowing by private banks. Speciﬁcally,
Bernanke and Mihov used a conventional borrowing function, in which borrowing depends
positively on the spread between the funds rate and the discount rate. Using data to June
1995, Nakashima (2005) found strong evidence against a model of the Japanese reserve
market that incorporates a U.S.-type borrowing function rather than one of the form of
equation (8).
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ing system, which is essentially equivalent to the CR model:
ure = umd − ugd − ucu
ugd = vgd
ucu = −αur + vcu
ure = −βur + vre
umd = ψgdvgd + ψcuvcr + ψrevre + vmd (10)
In this context, the VAR innovation, umd, is deﬁned as follows:
umd = ubr + umo
The above system can be represented in the form of equation (3) as follows:
I −G0 =


1 0 0 0
0 1 α 0
−1 −1 β 1
0 0 0 1

 , A
 =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
ψgd ψcu ψre 1


u′ =
[
ugd ucu ur umd
]
, v′ =
[
vgd vcu vre vmd
]
Inverting the above relationship reveals how the monetary policy shock, vmd,
depends on the VAR innovations:
vmd = −(αψcu + βψre)ur + (1− ψre)ure + (1− ψcu)ucu + (1− ψgd)ugd(11)
The CR model described by the above system has nine unknown pa-
rameters (including the variances of four structural shocks) to be estimated
from 10 covariances. Hence, there is one overidentifying restriction.
2.4 After July 1995 – LIP (Low Interest-Rate Policy) Model
The following system of equations describes the LIP model:
ure = ubr + umo − ugd − ucu
12
ugd = vgd
ucu = −αur + vcu
ure = −βur + vre
ubr = vbr (12)
umo = θgdvgd + θcuvcu + θrevre + θbrvbr + vmo (13)
The structure of the LIP model diﬀers from that of the CR model in equa-
tion (12). This equation indicates that the BOJ passively accommodates
the demand shock for discount-window borrowing by private banks, vbr.
Equation (13) represents the open-market operations behavior of the BOJ.
The LIP model assumes that the BOJ can use only open-market operations
to proactively supply high-powered money. Therefore, the high-powered
money supply shock, vs, is deﬁned as the monetary-policy shock of the BOJ
in this model. Consequently, the LIP model can be written in the form of
equation (3) as follows:
I −G0 =


1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 α 0
0 0 1 β 0
1 1 1 −γ −1
0 0 0 0 1


, A =


1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
θgd θcu θre θbr 1


u′ =
[
ugd ucu ure ur umo
]
, v′ =
[
vgd vcu vre vbr vmo
]
One can also invert the above relationship to determine how the monetary
policy shock, vs, depends on the VAR innovations:
vs = −(αθcu + βθre)ur + (θbr + 1)umo
− (θbr + θre)ure − (θbr + θcu)ucu − (θbr + θgd)ugd (14)
The LIP model described by the above structural VAR system has 11
unknown parameters (including the variances of ﬁve structural shocks) to
be estimated from 15 covariances. Hence, there are four overidentifying
restrictions.
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2.5 Theoretical Models for Alternative Operating Procedures
Parameters in the BOJ behavior functions, given by equation (10) in the CR
model and by equation (13) in the LIP model, deﬁne how the BOJ controls
the market for bank reserves in each model. For example, the proposition
that the BOJ targets only the call rate can be represented by three additional
restrictions in the CR model, ψgd = 1, ψcu = 1 and ψre = 1, and by four
additional restrictions in the LIP model, θgd = 1, θcu = 1, θre = 1 and
θbr = −1. In this case, the monetary policy shocks can be recovered by
using the VAR innovations to the call rate. According to this proposition,
the call rate provides the best policy indicator of the BOJ.
Alternative propositions that deﬁne the BOJ’s policy in terms of both
the call rate and quantity indicators, such as currency and reserves, can also
be represented by parametric restrictions in the BOJ behavior functions.
For example, the proposition that the BOJ targets both the call rate and
reserves can be written in terms of two additional restrictions in the CR
model, ψgd = 1 and ψcu = 1, and three additional restrictions in the LIP
model, θgd = 1, θcu = 1 and θbr = −1. In this case, the policy shocks
can be recovered by using linear combinations of the VAR innovations to
the call rate and reserves. According to this proposition, a hybrid variable
comprising the call rate and reserves provides a good policy indicator of the
BOJ. Hence, imposing various parametric restrictions on equations (10) and
(13), respectively, yields six alternative models that are nested within the
CR and LIP models. In particular, we describe two of the six models as
single-targeting models, which assume that the BOJ targets a single mon-
etary variable, while four are described as mixed-targeting models, which
assume that the BOJ targets a combination of the following policy-sector
variables: the call rate, currency, reserves and high-powered money (cur-
rency plus reserves). Table 2 presents the models, which imply diﬀerent
14
forms of BOJ operating procedures. In what follows, we examine the BOJ’s
policy indicator by estimating the six alternative models and the CR and
LIP models.
2.6 Data, Estimation and Results
As explained in Subsection 2.1, the Bernanke–Mihov methodology accom-
modates the inclusion of both policy variables and nonpolicy variables in
the VAR system. Included in the nonpolicy sector are the output gap (y)
for the industrial production index (1995=100, seasonally adjusted) and
the rate of inﬂation (π) in the consumer price index (1995=100, excluding
food products). The consumer price index is seasonally adjusted by the X11
method. The output gap was measured by using percentage deviations from
the trend, which was constructed by using the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter. 10
The inﬂation rate is annual.
Consider the policy variables in the VAR system. As discussed in Sub-
sections 2.3 and 2.4, the development of equilibrium models of the market
for bank reserves involves the use of identities between assets and liabilities
in the BOJ’s balance sheet (Table 1). Government deposits (GD), currency
(CU) and reserves (RE) are used for liabilities. Furthermore, ‘the assets held
via open-market operations (MO)’, which comprise bills, bonds and overseas
assets acquired by the BOJ through these operations, are used for assets. 11
In addition to these four variables, the call rate (R) is included in the policy
sector. 12 Therefore, we estimate the seven-variable VAR system for y, π,
10To apply the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter, we used a value of the smoothing parameter for
monthly data of 129,600, as proposed by Ravin and Uhlig (2002).
11Each equilibrium condition in the CR and LIP models requires one of the quantity
variables in the policy sector to be redundant. Therefore, we exclude borrowed reserves
(BR) from the policy sector.
12For details of MO, see Appendix A. Normalizing the policy-sector variables, except
for R, causes log-linear estimation to violate the identity relationship between assets and
liabilities. To deal with this problem, Bernanke and Mihov suggested that the policy-
sector variables should be normalized by using a 36-month moving average of past values
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GD, CU, RE, R and MO. All data were obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS,
and the sample period is from January 1976 to May 2003. To determine
the number of lags in the VAR systems, we applied the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC). This criterion suggested 15 lags.
To estimate the CR and LIP models, we use a two-step procedure. In
the ﬁrst step, we estimate the reduced-form VAR by using equation-by-
equation OLS estimation for the full-sample period from 1976 to 2003. OLS
estimation generates ﬁve policy-sector VAR innovations: ugd, ucu, ure, ur
and umo. For post-1995 estimation of the LIP model, we can use the ﬁve
VAR innovations. However, pre-1995 estimation of the CR model requires
the construction of umd, which is the VAR innovation of ‘the assets held
via open-market operations and discount-window lending (MD)’. To obtain
umd, after generating ubr from ugd, ucu, ure and umo by using the market-
equilibrium condition in equation (4), we add ubr and umo. Therefore, for
pre-June 1995 estimation of the CR model, we use the four policy-sector
VAR innovations of ugd, ucu, ur and umd. 13 In addition, for post-1995
estimation of the LIP model, we must take it into account that, in March
2001, the BOJ oﬃcially adopted a new operating procedure by targeting the
of total reserves. We adopt this approach by normalizing the policy-sector variables by
using a 36-month moving average of past values of ‘the BOJ’s assets held via open-market
operations and discount-window lending (MD)’, generated by summing MO and discount-
window lending. For details of MD, see Appendix A.
13We can also estimate the CR model by directly using ‘the assets held via open-market
operations and discount-window lending (MD)’, which comprises MO and discount-
window lending. This requires estimation of the six-variable VAR system (in y, π, GD,
CU, R and MD) for the CR model. The author conﬁrms that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence between the estimation results for the CR model based on the six-variable VAR and
those based on the seven-variable VAR. However, the use of the six-variable VAR requires
estimation of separate VAR systems for the pre- and post-1995 periods. Therefore, the
CR and LIP models on diﬀerent VAR systems not only diﬀer in their contemporaneous
structures of the reserve market, but also in their dynamic structures of macroeconomy.
Given that we are attempting to identify a useful policy measure over time by focusing
on the diﬀerence in the contemporaneous structure of the reserve market before and after
1995, it is important to minimize diﬀerences between the two models through the use of
a single VAR system. This approach is adopted in this paper.
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level of reserves as much as by continuing with the so-called zero interest-rate
policy. We should carefully examine whether the LIP model can capture this
change in the BOJ’s operating procedures in March 2001. Hence, for pre-
and post-2001 estimation of the LIP model, we split the ﬁve policy-sector
VAR innovations, which is generated for post-1995 estimation of the LIP
model, at March 2001.
In the second step, full-information maximum likelihood estimation is
applied to the structural VAR system of equation (3). The log likelihood
function to be maximized is as follows:
L(I −G,A,Σ

) = −(T/2){log|I −G|2 − log|A|2 − log|Σ

|2}
− (T/2)trace{(I −G)′(A−1)′Σ

−1A−1(I −G)Σ

}
where Σ

is the estimate of the covariance matrix of the policy-sector VAR
innovations and Σ

is the diagonal matrix that diagonally locates the vari-
ances of the structural shocks. Following Bernanke and Mihov, we performed
two types of test on the models: (1) tests of the validity of the full set of
overidentifying restrictions; and (2) joint hypothesis tests on the structural
parameters, conditional on the validity of both the CR and LIP models.
For ease of interpretation, we deﬁne ‘weighting parameters’, ω, in the
CR, LIP and mixed-targeting models. The weighting parameters are the
absolute values of the parameters corresponding to the VAR innovations in
the BOJ behavior functions, (10) and (13). The absolute values in the be-
havior functions are normalized to sum to unity. For example, the weighting
parameters in the CR model are:
vmd = ωrur + ωreure + ωcuucu + ωgdugd,
where ωr + ωre + ωcu + ωgd = 1. Each ω satisﬁes ωr = |(αψcu + βψre)/k|,
ωre = |(1 − ψre)/k|, ωcu = |(1 − ψcu)/k| and ωgd = |(1 − ψgd)/k|, where
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k = |αψcu + βψre|+ |1− ψre|+ |1− ψcu|+ |1− ψgd|. 14
In the estimation reported in Tables 3 and 4, we take into account the
following points. 15
1. For the pre-June 1995 period, the parameter estimates of the BOJ
behavior function in the CR and mixed-targeting models are close to
unity. This is consistent with the CL model being the most easily
accepted, and with the estimates of ωr being relatively high. Fur-
thermore, all other models except the HP model are easily accepted.
These results indicate that the call rate is the best policy indicator of
the BOJ for the period before June 1995.
2. For the post-July 1995 period, estimation results for before and after
March 2001 diﬀer. For the ﬁrst subperiod, before March 2001, the
parameter estimates of the BOJ behavior function in the LIP and
mixed-targeting models are close to unity. In addition, the CL model
is easily accepted, whereas the HP model is strongly rejected. Taking
the pre-June 1995 results into account, we conclude that the call rate
represents the BOJ’s actual policy variable for the pre-February 2001
period, including the pre-June 1995 period.
3. For the second subperiod, from March 2001, the single-targeting mod-
els, the CL and HP models, are rejected at the ﬁve-percent level of
signiﬁcance. However, the LIP model and the two mixed-targeting
14Similarly, the weighting parameters in the LIP model are:
vs = ωrur + ωmoumo + ωreure + ωcuucu + ωgdugd,
where ωr + ωmo + ωre + ωcu + ωgd = 1. Each ω satisﬁes ωr = |(αθcu + βθre)/k|, ωre =
|(θbr + θre)/k|, ωcu = |(θbr + θcu)/k| and ωgd = |(θbr + θgd)/k|, where k = |αθcu+βθre|+
|θbr + θre|+ |θbr + θcu|+ |θbr + θgd|. The weighting parameters in each of the four mixed-
targeting models, including the CL–CU–RE, CL–CU, CL–RE and CL–HP models, shown
in Table 2, are deﬁned similarly.
15In all 14 models, the parameter estimates of the demand functions are of the expected
sign, although some estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant.
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models, the CL–CU–RE and CL–RE models, are easily accepted. In
particular, the estimates of ω in the three models indicate that, since
March 2001, the BOJ has been equally concerned about the call rate
and reserves. These results suggest that an equally weighted average
of the call rate and reserves can be used as the policy indicator of the
BOJ in this period. 16
2.7 The Actual Policy Measure of the BOJ
The estimation results suggest that the composition of the BOJ’s policy
measure might diﬀer between periods. Hence, to calculate a useful policy
measure over time, we apply the method proposed by Bernanke and Mihov.
First, we calculate the sum of the policy shock and the corresponding ele-
ment of A−1(I − G)P t. Speciﬁcally, in terms of equation (3), this is the
fourth element in the context of the CR model and its six associated models,
and is the ﬁfth element in the context of the LIP and its six associated mod-
els. For the CR model, P t includes the four policy variables, R, RE, CU and
GD, while for the LIP model, P t includes the ﬁve policy variables, R, MO,
RE, CU, GD. This procedure generates seven series in the three periods,
pre-June 1995, July 1995 to February 2001 and post-March 2001. Next, we
normalize the p-values of the tests of the overidentifying restrictions per-
formed in each subperiod so that they sum to unity. Using the normalized
values, we derive a weighted average policy measure in each period. Then,
we normalize the calculated policy measure at each date by subtracting it
from a 36-month moving average of its own past values over the entire pe-
riod. This implies that zero is the benchmark for ‘normal’ monetary policy
16For robust checking of the results for the three subperiods, VAR systems are estimated
with 12, 13, 14, 16, and 17 lags. The ordering of the VARs does not materially aﬀect the
results.
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(normal at least in terms of recent experience). 17 The historical values
are referred to as the ‘actual policy measure’ of the BOJ. Figure 2 shows
the obtained policy measure from January 1980 to May 2003. 18 Several
features are noteworthy.
1. After a temporary tightening immediately following the Plaza Agree-
ment of September 1985, the policy stance in the late 1980s was sub-
stantially expansionary.
2. In the early 1990s, when the bubble economy of the late 1980s burst,
the policy stance was contractionary.
3. In the mid 1990s, the policy stance was expansionary at the beginning
of the period of the low interest-rate policy in June 1995. After that,
the policy stance in the late 1990s was neutral.
4. Except for a temporary tightening involving raising the call rate in Au-
gust 2000, the policy stance has been expansionary since the beginning
17The issue of how we should deﬁne normal (or neutral) policy is an important macroe-
conomic issue. Following Bernanke and Mihov, we use the 36-month moving average
method to derive a neutral policy indicator in each month. As an alternative to our neu-
tral policy indicator, arguably, the natural rate of interest, which is the real short-term
interest rate consistent with output being at its natural rate and inﬂation being constant,
is the most appropriate indicator of neutral policy (see, e.g., Blinder (1998)). However,
the use of the natural real interest rate is problematic for two reasons. First, the stan-
dard approach to calculating the path of the natural rate has not yet been established.
As Laubach and Williams (2003) have pointed out, econometric estimates of the natural
rate of interest are imprecise. Second, quantitative conceptualization of the BOJ’s policy
stance based on the natural rate of interest is quite inconsistent with the framework of this
paper. This is because the BOJ’s policy indicator obtained by using estimates from the
CR, LIP and their associated models implies diﬀerent monetary indicators, including the
call rate, reserves and currency, which are not measured in comparable units. The moving
average method proposed by Bernanke and Mihov has the advantage of alleviating this
problem of inconsistent units of measurement. Hence, in what follows, we measure the
BOJ’s policy stance based on the neutral policy indicator obtained by using the moving
average method.
18Positive values indicate an easing of monetary policy, while negative values indicate
a tightening. The actual policy measure is scaled so that it has the same variance as the
call rate.
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of the quantitative easing of policy in March 2001.
3 Actual and Optimal Policy Measures
This section simulates optimal policy decisions by using various types of
targeting rule, which requires that we set up the BOJ’s objective function.
19 In addition, in this section, we evaluate Japanese monetary history by
comparing the resulting optimal policy paths, referred to as ‘optimal policy
measures’, with the actual policy measure.
3.1 Calculating Optimal Policy Measures
Similarly to Bernanke and Mihov’s VAR system, given by equations (1)
and (2), we assume that the economy is described by the following linear
structural model:
Y t =
k∑
i=0
BiY t−i +
k∑
i=1
Cipt−i + Ayv
y
t
pt =
k∑
i=0
DiY t−i +
k∑
i=1
Gipt−i + v
p
t ,
where pt is the actual policy measure. The vector of nonpolicy variables
in the VAR is denoted by Y ′t = (yt, πt), which includes the output gap for
industrial production (y) and the rate of inﬂation (π). The AIC suggests the
use of 12 lags in the VAR system. In what follows, we calculate the BOJ’s
optimal policy measures, taking as given the estimated dynamic behavior
of the nonpolicy sector in the three-variable VAR system. This implies that
the BOJ makes optimal policy decisions by monitoring the behavior of two
nonpolicy variables, the output gap and inﬂation.
19Sack (2000), using a targeting rule, derived optimal paths for the federal funds rate.
He evaluated U.S. monetary history, particularly in the post-Volcker period, by comparing
historically set values of the funds rate with the values implied by the optimal funds rate
paths.
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The following objective function is assumed for the BOJ:
Et
∞∑
i=1
βi[λy2t + (1− λ)(πt − π∗)2]
where β ≥ 0 is a discount factor. The parameter λ ≥ 0 is the weight
on output and inﬂation stabilization, and π∗ is the BOJ’s target rate of
inﬂation.
To solve the optimization problem, we deﬁne a state vector that includes
current and lagged values of the output gap and inﬂation, and lagged values
of the actual policy measure as follows:
X ′t = {yt, yt−1, . . . , yt−12, πt, πt−1, . . . , πt−12, pt−1, pt−2, . . . , pt−12, 1}.
The optimal policy is a solution to the following Bellman equation:
V (Xt) = min
pt
{(Xt −X∗)′Q(Xt −X∗) + βEt[V (Xt+1)]}
subject to
Xt+1 = RXt + Spt + t+1. (15)
where Q is a matrix that has relative weights corresponding to the output
gap and inﬂation on the leading diagonal, and zeros elsewhere. The dynam-
ics of the state vector are governed by the matrix R and the vector S, which
incorporate the point estimates of the coeﬃcients from the nonpolicy sector
in the VAR.
Since the per-period payout is quadratic and the dynamics are linear,
the value function has the following form:
V (X) = X ′ΛX + 2X ′Ω+ β(1− β)−1trace(ΛΣ) (16)
where Σ = E(t′t) is the covariance matrix of the disturbance vector.
It can be shown that the solution to this problem is given by:
poptimalt = −(S′ΛS)−1[(S′ΛR)Xt + S′Ω] (17)
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where poptimalt denotes an ‘optimal policy measure’. The matrix Λ must
satisfy the following Riccati equation:
Λ = −Q +R′ΛR−R′ΛS(S′ΛS)−1S′ΛR.
In addition, Ω satisﬁes the following:
Ω = {I −R′[I −ΛS(S′ΛS)−1S′]}−1QX∗.
In equation (17), the optimal policy measure is a function of all current
and lagged values of the nonpolicy variables and lagged values of the actual
policy measure. The behavior of the optimal policy measure depends on the
three parameters in the problem, β, λ and π∗. Following Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999), a discount factor of β = 1 is henceforth imposed. 20 The
remaining parameters are choice variables of the BOJ. For the target rate
of inﬂation, we assume π∗ = 1.64, which is the sample average of π for the
period from January 1980 to May 2003. 21 In the following subsection, we
calculate the optimal policy measure for diﬀerent values of λ. Furthermore,
we compare the calculated optimal policy measures with the actual policy
measure. 22
3.2 Comparative Analysis of Actual and Optimal Measures
For an optimal policy measure in the form of (17), the dynamics from model
(15) are as follows:
Xt+1 = V Xt + W + t+1 (18)
20The results are not sensitive to the value of the discount factor. Rudebusch and
Svensson showed that for β = 1, the optimal value function (16) reduces to V () =
trace(ΛΣ). We have used this function to calculate the optimal values in Table 5.
21Clarida et al. (1998) explained that, if the sample period is suﬃciently long, their
method produces a target rate of inﬂation, π∗, that is similar to the sample average.
Indeed, by applying this method, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) obtained π∗ = 1.73 for the
period from April 1979 to December 1998. This estimated value is close to the sample
average value of inﬂation calculated in this paper.
22The way the optimal policy measures are computed is subject to the Lucas (1976)
critique. See Appendix B for details.
23
where V = R − S(S′ΛS)−1(S′ΛR) and W = −S(S′ΛS)−1S′Ω. In equa-
tion (18), the ﬁrst and second elements of X represent optimal paths for
the output gap and inﬂation, respectively, under an optimal policy rule. In
the following analysis, we compare the simulated paths for the output gap
and inﬂation as well as for an optimal policy with their actual paths, for a
given value of λ. 23
First, we analyze the ‘ﬂexible targeting rule’, in which λ = 0.5, and con-
sider this case as a benchmark. The justiﬁcation is that, in this case, the
central bank cares about output stabilization as well as inﬂation stabiliza-
tion, which is realistic. 24 The bold lines in Figure 4 represent the optimal
paths for policy, output and inﬂation, while the thick lines represent the
actual paths. In particular, the optimal policy path represents the policy
measure, poptimalt , that is predicted by the ﬂexible targeting rule given the
state of economy in each month. In other words, the optimal policy path in-
dicates that, for any particular month, the BOJ makes the optimal decision
given that it has previously implemented its actual policy. The following
features are noteworthy.
1. In the late 1980s, in the period of the bubble economy, monetary
tightening was delayed.
2. In the early 1990s, when the bubble economy burst, the BOJ’s actual
23As expected, the third element of  reduces the actual policy measure. Equation
(18) is referred to as an optimal closed system. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, Chap.
4) for details.
24Figure 3 shows the trade-oﬀ between inﬂation variability and output gap variability
for weights on output stabilization (λ) ranging from 0 to 1 in intervals of 0.001. Table
5 indicates the performance of various rules for several illustrative cases. The results are
based on unconditional covariance matrices for  in equation (18), which are calculated
by using the doubling algorithm described in Anderson et al. (1996). Figure 3 indicates
that, as λ decreases, the optimal rule corresponds to points further southeast on the curve.
In particular, points A, D and G correspond to strict output targeting, ﬂexible target-
ing and strict inﬂation targeting, respectively. Each ﬁgure and table provides empirical
justiﬁcation for treating the ﬂexible targeting rule as the benchmark.
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policy stance might have been too contractionary.
3. From the early to the mid 1990s, an easing of monetary policy was
delayed; i.e., the BOJ should have implemented a more expansionary
policy.
4. From 1996 to 1998, the BOJ should have tightened policy to reduce
output and inﬂation.
5. From the late 1990s, the BOJ should have implemented a more expan-
sionary policy to alleviate the deﬂationary recession.
Next, we analyze two extreme cases, represented by λ = 0.0 and 1.0.
Figure 5 illustrates both cases. The case in which there is ‘strict inﬂation-
targeting rule’, when λ = 0.0, (in the left column), exhibits the following
features.
1. The ﬂuctuations in the optimal output path are slightly greater than
those under the ‘ﬂexible targeting rule’, when λ = 0.5. On the other
hand, the optimal inﬂation path is stable, at around π∗ = 1.64.
2. Similarly to when λ = 0.5, monetary tightening in the late 1980s was
delayed.
3. Similarly to when λ = 0.5, monetary tightening in the early 1990s
might have been excessive.
4. Contrary to when λ = 0.5, the optimal policy path from the early to
the mid 1990s is identical to the actual policy path. This implies that
this period’s moderate easing was reasonable given the rule.
5. If the BOJ had adopted the strict inﬂation-targeting rule of π∗ = 1.64
from the late 1990s, it could have overcome deﬂation by substantially
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easing policy. However, policy easing would not have necessarily raised
output.
The case of the ‘strict output-targeting rule’, when λ = 1.0 (in the right
column), exhibits the following features.
1. The ﬂuctuations in the optimal output path are much smaller than
those under the ‘ﬂexible targeting rule’ and the ‘strict inﬂation tar-
geting rule’, whereas the ﬂuctuations in the optimal inﬂation path are
much larger.
2. Similarly to when λ = 0.5 and λ = 0.0, the optimal policy path sug-
gests delayed tightening in the late 1980s.
3. Similarly to when λ = 0.5, and contrary to when λ = 0.0, monetary
easing from the early to the mid 1990s was delayed.
4. Similarly to when λ = 0.5 and λ = 0.0, the optimal policy path in
the early 1990s indicates that the substantial tightening that occurred
in that period might have been excessive. However, when λ = 1.0,
the optimal path in this period is closer to the actual path than when
λ = 0.5 and λ = 0.0.
5. Contrary to when λ = 0.5 and λ = 0.0, the optimal policy path from
the late 1990s ﬂuctuates widely. In particular, the steep decline of
the optimal path in August 2000 implies the temporary tightening
involving raising the call rate was reasonable given the rule.
4 Conclusion
This paper has drawn three main conclusions.
First, we suggest that the call rate should be used as the policy indicator
of the BOJ to February 2001, and that an equally weighted average of the
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call rate and reserves should be used as the BOJ’s policy indicator from
March 2001. These suggestions are noteworthy because no simple monetary
measure represents the BOJ’s past policy decisions over time.
Second, evaluation of the BOJ’s policy, especially from the early 1990s,
depends on the type of optimal policy rule used as a yardstick. When
the strict inﬂation-targeting rule is used as the yardstick, there is evidence
that the moderate expansion between the early and mid 1990s was reason-
able. However, under the assumption that the BOJ committed itself to
output stabilization-oriented rules, including the ﬂexible targeting rule and
the strict output-targeting rule, a more aggressive and expansionary pol-
icy was needed. The same comments apply to policy evaluation from the
late 1990s. When the strict output-targeting rule is used as the yardstick,
the evidence suggests that the temporary tightening in August 2000 was
reasonable. However, under the assumption that the BOJ paid attention
to inﬂation stabilization, including the ﬂexible targeting rule and the strict
inﬂation-targeting rule, a persistent easining was needed. These comments
suggest that one should not make sweeping judgments based on a particular
policy rule about whether monetary policy undertaken at a particular time
is reasonable.
Third, whatever optimal policy rules are adopted as yardsticks, the fol-
lowing is possible: (1) the BOJ’s policy stance in the late 1980s was too
expansionary and tightening in this period was delayed; (2) the tightening
in the early 1990s was excessive.
In this paper, by applying Bernanke and Mihov’s methodology, we have
presented a useful policy measure of the BOJ that represents its past policy
decisions over time. One could use this indicator to, for example, implement
impulse response analysis or analyze the dynamic responses of monetary
policy to diﬀerent macroeconomic shocks. Using this measure to complete
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these tasks is left to future research. 25
Appendix A: Constructing MO
・Construction of MO:
First, we apply X11 to foreign assets (net), claims on government,
claims on deposit-money banks, lending to deposit-money banks and
unclassiﬁed assets (net). Second, we subtract lending to deposit-
money banks (SA) from the claims on deposit-money banks (SA).
26 The transformed data measure claims that the BOJ acquires via
open-market operations on deposit-money banks. Then, we deﬁne the
sum of the transformed data, foreign assets (SA), claims on govern-
ment (SA) and the unclassiﬁed assets (SA) as MO: the BOJ’s assets
held via open-market operations. All data were obtained from Nikkei
NEEDS (Monetary Survey, Accounts of Monetary Authority).
・Construction of MD:
After applying X11 to lending to deposit-money banks, we deﬁne the
sum of lending (SA) and MO as MD: the BOJ’s assets held via open-
market operations and discount-window lending.
Appendix B: The Lucas Critique and Stability of the VAR
Optimal policy measures are derived under the assumption that the non-
policy sector of the reduced-form VAR, in the form of equation (15), is
invariant to policy rules chosen by the BOJ and is therefore subject to the
Lucas (1976) critique. However, for the U.S. postwar period, Rudebusch
(2005) has recently argued that reduced forms, such as VARs, of forward-
looking macroeconomic speciﬁcations are insensitive to the policy-rule shifts
25The resulting policy measure is obtainable from the author.
26SA denotes seasonally adjusted data.
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identiﬁed by Clarida et al. (2000), Estrella and Fuhrer (2003) and Taylor
(1999); hence, the Lucas critique does not necessarily apply to estimated
autoregressive reduced forms. 27
In the context of Japanese monetary history, Jinushi et al. (2000) have
identiﬁed a policy-rule shift in the response of the BOJ to inﬂation and
output over the past twenty years. Given the observation of Jinushi et al.,
the stability of the nonpolicy sector in the reduced-form VAR is required if
Rudebusch’s ﬁnding is to apply to our data set. Hence, in this appendix, we
statistically examine the stability of the nonpolicy sector in the reduced-form
VAR of equation (15).
We employ three types of Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, the Sup LM, the
Exp LM, and the Ave LM test, proposed by Andrews (1993) and Andrews
and Ploberger (1994). For the tests of structural change, the null hypotheses
of the parameter stability of the output gap and that of the inﬂation equation
are tested against the corresponding alternative hypotheses of parameter
instability. Further, we use the methodology presented by Hansen (1997)
to calculate asymptotic p-values for the structural-change tests. 28 Table
6 reports the test results for parameter stability of the output gap and the
inﬂation equation. For our estimated output-gap equation, the p-values of
the Sup LM, the Exp LM and the Ave LM test statistics are 0.07, 0.08 and
0.17, respectively. For the inﬂation equation, the corresponding p-values are
0.14, 0.13 and 0.40. Hence, our estimated equations for the nonpolicy sector
pass the structural-change tests.
27Indeed, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Estrella
and Fuhrer (2003) all provide evidence of the stability of autoregressive reduced forms.
28We compute the LM test statistics and the corresponding p-values by using the GAUSS
code programmed by Professor Bruce Hansen. The LM statistics are computed by using
the middle 70 percent of the sample.
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Table 1: The BOJ’s Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
Discount-window Lending(ubr) Government Deposits(ugd)
Assets Held via Open-Market Operations(umo) Currency Held by the Public(ucu)
(Security, Float, Other Net Assets) Bank Deposits(ure)
Table 2: Alternative Models for the BOJ’s Operating Procedures
CR Model (Before June 1995)
Models
BOJ Equations
Monetary Policy Shocks
ψgd ψcu ψre
CL (Call Rate) 1.00 1.00 1.00 vmd = −(α + β)ur
HP (High-powered Money) 1.00 0.00 0.00 vmd = uhp (= ure + ucu)
CL-CU-RE 1.00 − − vmd = −(αψcu + βψre)ur + (1− ψre)ure + (1− ψcu)ucu
CL-CU 1.00 − 1.00 vmd = −(αψcu + β)ur + (1− ψcu)ucu
CL-RE 1.00 1.00 − vmd = −(α + βψre)ur + (1− ψre)ure
CL-HP 1.00 ψre = ψcu vmd = −{(α + β)ψcu}ur + (1− ψcu)uhp
LIP Model (After July 1995)
Models
BOJ Equations
Monetary Policy Shocks
θgd θcu θre θbr
CL (Call Rate) 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.00 vs = −(α + β)ur
HP (High-powered Money) 1.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 vs = uhp (= ure + ucu)
CL-CU-RE 1.00 − − -1.00 vs = −(αθcu + βθre)ur + (1− θre)ure + (1− θcu)ucu
CL-CU 1.00 − 1.00 -1.00 vs = −(αθcu + β)ur + (1− θcu)ucu
CL-RE 1.00 1.00 − -1.00 vs = −(α + βθre)ur + (1− θre)ure
CL-HP 1.00 θre = θcu -1.00 vs = −{(α + β)θcu + γ}ur + (1− θcu)uhp
1. CL, HP, CU and RE imply the call rate, high-powered money, currency and reserves, respec-
tively.
2. We descrive the CL and HP models as single-targeting models, which assume that the BOJ
targets a single-monetary variable.
3. We descrive the CL-CU-RE, CL-CU, CL-RE and CL-HP models as mixed-targeting models,
which assume that the BOJ targets a combination of the following policy-sector variables:
CL, HP, CU and RE.
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Table 3: Estimation Results from the Credit Rationing (CR) Model
(1976:1–1995:6)
Models
Demand Equations BOJ Equations
OIR JOINT
Weights 　
α β ψgd ψcu ψre ωr ωcu ωre ωgd
CR
0.04 0.05 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.52 − 0.75 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.21)
CL
0.02 0.02
1.00 1.00 1.00
1.91 0.38 − − − −
(0.02) (0.02) (0.75) (0.94)
HP
0.03 0.03
1.00 0.00 0.00
179 179 − − − −
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CL-CU-RE
0.07 0.07
1.00
0.99 0.99 1.56 0.03
0.87 0.06 0.06 −
(0.04) (0.05) (0.13) (0.15) (0.46) (0.86)
CL-CU
0.06 0.02
1.00
0.99
1.00
2.71 0.74
0.89 0.10 − −
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.44) (0.69)
CL-RE
0.01 0.02
1.00 1.00
0.99 1.91 0.39
0.75 − 0.24 −
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.59) (0.82)
CL-HP
0.07 0.07
1.00
0.99 0.99 1.56 0.03
0.93 0.06 0.06 −
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.67) (0.98)
1. For the Demand Equations and BOJ Equations, standard errors are in parentheses.
2. OIR and Joint indicate overidentifying restrictions test statistics and joint test statistics,
respectively. p-values are in parentheses.
3. A likelihood ratio test was used to test the overidentifying restrictions. The degrees of
freedom are one for the CR model, four for the CL and HP models, two for the CL-CU-RE
model and three for the CL-CU, CL-RE and CL-HP models.
4. A likelihood ratio test was used to test the joint hypotheses. The degrees of freedom are
three for the CL and HP models, one for the CL-CU-RE model and two for the CL-CU,
CL-RE and CL-HP models.
34
Table 4: Estimation Results from the Low Interest Rates (LIP) Model
(1995:7–2003:5)
First Subperiod (1995:7–2001:2)
Models
Demand Equations BOJ Equations
OIR JOINT
Weights 　
α β θgd θcu θre θbr ωr ωcu ωre ωgd ωmo
LIP
0.01 0.23 0.99 0.91 0.91 -0.95 4.74 − 0.63 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14
(0.02) (0.52) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.31)
CL
0.02 0.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.00
7.78 2.82 − − − − −
(0.01) (0.01) (0.45) (0.59)
HP
0.04 0.53
1.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
44.8 49.6 − − − − −
(0.02) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00)
CL-CU-RE
0.07 0.02
1.00
0.99 0.95
-1.00
8.59 2.82
0.59 0.07 0.33 − −
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.20) (0.24)
CL-CU
0.09 0.09
1.00
0.99
1.00 -1.00
8.68 3.60
0.97 0.03 − − −
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.28) (0.31)
CL-RE
0.05 0.10
1.00 1.00
0.99
-1.00
11.1 5.33
0.94 − 0.06 − −
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.13) (0.15)
CL-HP
0.03 0.00
1.00
1.00 1.00
-1.00
7.80 3.30
1.00 0.00 0.00 − −
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.35) (0.35)
Second Subperiod (2001:3–2003:5)
Models
Demand Equations BOJ Equations
OIR JOINT
Weights 　
α β θgd θcu θre θbr ωr ωcu ωre ωgd ωmo
LIP
0.08 0.12 0.97 0.75 0.32 -0.96 4.98 − 0.30 0.13 0.49 0.05 0.03
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.12) (0.04) (0.29)
CL
0.06 0.14
1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.00
18.0 12.3 − − − − −
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
HP
0.14 0.86
1.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
104 100 − − − − −
(0.05) (1.06) (0.00) (0.00)
CL-CU-RE
0.06 0.42
1.00
0.91 0.58
-1.00
5.01 3.58
0.38 0.11 0.51 − −
(0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.04) (0.54) (0.16)
CL-CU
0.15 0.15
1.00
0.99
1.00 -1.00
43.6 40.2
1.00 0.00 − − −
(0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
CL-RE
0.05 0.42
1.00 1.00
0.59
-1.00
5.46 3.11
0.42 − 0.58 − −
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.60) (0.21)
CL-HP
0.05 0.02
1.00
0.99 0.99
-1.00
45.1 34.8
0.92 0.07 0.07 − −
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
1. For the Demand Equations and BOJ Equations, standard errors are in parentheses.
2. OIR and Joint indicate overidentifying restrictions test statistics and joint test statistics,
respectively. p-values are in parentheses.
3. A likelihood ratio test was used to test the overidentifying restrictions. The degrees of
freedom are four for the LIP model, eight for the CL and HP models, six for the CL-CU-RE
model and seven for the CL-CU, CL-RE and CL-HP models.
4. A likelihood ratio test was used to test the joint hypotheses. The degrees of freedom are four
for the CL and HP models, two for the CL-CU-RE model and three for the CL-CU, CL-RE
and CL-HP models.
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Table 5: Performance of Policy Rules
Rule Std. dev. (y) Std. dev. (π) Loss. fn.
Actual Policy 3.34 1.96 −
A (λ = 1.00) 1.17 3.13 -11.9
B (λ = 0.75) 1.37 2.53 -91.2
C (λ = 0.54) 1.82 1.96 -136
D (λ = 0.50) 1.92 1.86 -141
E (λ = 0.25) 2.76 1.07 -140
F (λ = 0.12) 3.34 0.60 -107
G (λ = 0.00) 4.01 0.25 -40.7
1. A, D and F denote strict output targeting, flexible targeting and strict inflation targeting,
respectively.
2. The optimal values of the loss function (16) are calculated by using V (X) = trace(ΛΣ).
3. The standard deviations are calculated by using the doubling algorithm described in Ander-
son et al. (1996).
Table 6: Structural Change Tests
Output Gap Inflation
Test Asymptotic Test Asymptotic
statistics p-values statistics p-values
Sup LM 63.9 0.07 60.4 0.14
Exp LM 27.6 0.08 26.5 0.13
Ave LM 42.1 0.17 37.9 0.40
1. The output-gap equation and the inflation equation are both estimated with 12 lags.
2. LM denotes the Lagrange multiplier statistic of the null hypothesis of no structural change.
3. Sup LM denotes the sup test for structural change proposed by Andrews (1993). Exp LM
and Ave LM, respectively, denote the exponential test and the average test proposed by
Andrews and Ploberger (1994).
4. Asymptotic p-values for the structural-change tests are computed using the methodology
proposed by Hansen (1997).
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Figure 2: The Bank of Japan’s Policy Measure
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Figure 4: Actual and Optimal Paths when λ = 0.50
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Figure 5: Actual and Optimal Paths when λ = 0.00 and λ = 1.00
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